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Organization, Vol. 15, No. 4, 563-583 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1350508408091007

Accountability Arrangements in Non-State Standards Organizations: Instrumental Design and Imitation

Lars H. Gulbrandsen

Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway, lars.gulbrandsen{at}fni.no

This paper analyses accountability arrangements in the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and other organizations that set standards for certification and eco-labelling. It focuses on two types of accountability that are likely to be achievable and important to non-state standards organizations: control and responsiveness. In setting a global standard based on a multi-stakeholder governance structure, FSC established a model for other certification schemes, specifically within the forestry and fisheries sectors. By creating the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), FSC-supporters exported the certification model to the fisheries sector. Industry-led forest certification schemes that were initiated to compete with FSC and offer an industry-dominated model have come to mimic procedural accountability arrangements initially established by their competitor. However, they have carefully filtered out the prescriptions that could reduce their influence in standard-setting processes. The paper argues that while certification schemes could enhance control of corporate environmental and social performance, some of the industry-dominated schemes adopt popular and fashionable accountability recipes to divert criticism of their activities instead of acting responsively to external constituents such as environmental and social groups.

Key Words: accountability • certification • eco-labelling • governance • institutions • private authority • standards


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